Not everyone who commits a crime physically carries out the actus reus. Some people plan the offence, some provide weapons, some stand by and encourage, and some help afterwards. The law of parties to crime (also called complicity or joint enterprise) ensures that everyone who plays a significant role in an offence can be held liable. This is one of the most important topics in criminal law because it determines how far liability extends beyond the person who physically commits the offence.
At common law, parties to crime were divided into four categories: the principal in the first degree (the person who actually commits the actus reus), the principal in the second degree (someone who assists at the scene), the accessory before the fact (someone who aids, abets, counsels, or procures the offence but is not present), and the accessory after the fact (someone who helps the offender after the offence). These categories have now been largely reformed by statute, but the underlying principles remain important.
| Category | Role | Key Feature | Legal Basis |
|---|---|---|---|
| Principal (first degree) | Commits the actus reus of the offence | Physically carries out the criminal act | Common law / statutory offence |
| Principal (second degree) | Assists or encourages at the scene | Present when the offence is committed | Accessories and Abettors Act 1861, s.8 |
| Accessory before the fact | Aids, abets, counsels, or procures | Not present at the scene | Accessories and Abettors Act 1861, s.8 |
| Accessory after the fact | Assists the offender after the offence | Only helps afterwards, not before or during | Accessories and Abettors Act 1861, s.4 |
The Serious Crime Act 2007 (Part 2) introduced a new statutory framework for secondary liability. It created three new offences: intentionally encouraging or assisting crime (s.44), encouraging or assisting crime believing it will be committed (s.45), and encouraging or assisting crime believing one or more offences will be committed (s.46). These offences are broader than the common law and can apply even where the principal offence is never actually committed. The common law principles of complicity still apply alongside the 2007 Act.
In your SQE1 exam, the most common scenario will involve complicity under the Accessories and Abettors Act 1861. You need to work out whether D is a principal or a secondary party, establish the actus reus and mens rea for complicity, consider any withdrawal issues, and then decide what offence D is liable for. The Serious Crime Act 2007 offences are less frequently tested but you should know the basic structure.
Whosoever shall aid, abet, counsel, or procure the commission of any indictable offence, whether the same be an offence at common law or by virtue of any Act passed or to be passed, shall be liable to be tried, indicted, and punished in the same manner as a principal offender.
Section 8 is the key statutory provision for complicity. It says that anyone who aids, abets, counsels, or procures an indictable offence is liable as a PRINCIPAL offender. This means the accessory is treated as if they had committed the offence themselves. They are charged with the same offence and face the same maximum sentence. The distinction between principal and accessory has been abolished for practical purposes — they are all treated as principals.
In R v Clarkson, the defendant was one of several American soldiers who entered a room where a woman was being raped. Clarkson did nothing to help the victim and did not actively encourage the rapists. He was simply present. The court held that mere PRESENCE at the scene of a crime is not enough to make someone liable as an accessory. There must be some active participation — some act of assistance or encouragement. Standing by and doing nothing, however morally reprehensible, does not amount to aiding or abetting.
R v Coney established that presence at the scene CAN amount to aiding and abetting if the presence is combined with ENCOURAGEMENT. If D is present and their presence encourages the principal to commit the offence, D can be liable. The key question is whether D intended their presence to encourage the principal. A crowd watching a street fight might encourage the participants, but individual members of the crowd are unlikely to be liable because they did not intend their presence as encouragement.
In R v Giannetto, the defendant arranged to meet the victim and drove him to a location where he was killed by Giannetto’s co-defendant. The court held that D could be liable as a secondary party even if he was not present at the exact moment the fatal act was committed, provided there was a COMMON PURPOSE to commit the offence. What matters is that D participated in a joint criminal enterprise and the offence was within the scope of that enterprise.
Do not confuse mere presence with active participation. Clarkson is the leading authority: being at the scene without doing anything to assist or encourage does NOT make you liable. But if your presence is combined with encouragement (Coney) or you are part of a joint enterprise (Giannetto), you can be liable. The critical question is always whether D did something that assisted or encouraged the principal.
Section 8 of the Accessories and Abettors Act 1861 sets out four ways in which a person can participate in an offence: aiding, abetting, counselling, and procuring. These are distinct concepts but they all lead to the same result — liability as a principal offender. You do not need to fit D neatly into one category. If D’s conduct falls within any of these four, they are liable. The categories overlap in practice.
Aiding means providing help or assistance to the principal offender. This can include providing weapons, acting as a lookout, driving the getaway car, or lending tools for a burglary. The assistance must be directed towards the commission of the offence and must actually help in some way. It does not need to be essential to the commission of the offence — even minor assistance can suffice if it was intended to help.
Abetting means encouraging or instigating the principal offender at the scene of the crime. It is typically done by words or gestures that give the principal confidence or enthusiasm to commit the offence. Cheering someone on, shouting encouragement, or nodding approval during the commission of the offence can all amount to abetting. The encouragement must happen while the offence is being committed or is about to be committed.
Counselling means advising, inciting, or urging someone to commit an offence. It usually happens BEFORE the offence is committed. The counsellor does not need to be present at the scene. Telling someone how to commit a burglary, suggesting that they assault a particular person, or planning an offence together can all amount to counselling. The key is that D must have given advice or encouragement that was intended to lead to the commission of the offence.
Procuring means causing or bringing about the commission of the offence. This is the most active form of participation. D does something that sets the offence in motion or makes it happen. Procuring goes beyond mere assistance — D’s actions are a direct cause of the offence being committed. Setting up a meeting at which an assault takes place, or arranging for someone to be in a particular place so they can be attacked, could amount to procuring.
In R v Calhaem, the defendant was a social worker who became obsessed with a former client. She repeatedly encouraged and incited a man to kill the client’s former boyfriend. The man eventually stabbed the victim to death. The Court of Appeal held that Calhaem was guilty of murder as an accessory before the fact. Her persistent incitement and encouragement amounted to counselling and procuring. She had set in train a chain of events that led to the killing.
In R v Bryce, the defendant and another man attacked the victim. During the attack, the co-accused produced a knife and killed the victim. Bryce argued that he did not know about the knife and did not intend the victim to be killed. The court held that the question was whether Bryce had the necessary mens rea for murder as a secondary party. The jury had to consider whether Bryce foresaw that the co-accused might use a weapon and, if so, whether he intended to assist in the attack knowing that death or GBH was a possible consequence.
In R v Stratford, the Supreme Court considered the liability of secondary parties where the principal committed an offence that was outside the scope of the agreed joint enterprise. The case confirmed that a secondary party is only liable for offences that fall within the scope of the common purpose. If the principal does something that was not agreed or foreseen, the secondary party is not liable for that departure. This reinforces the importance of the scope of the joint enterprise in determining secondary liability.
The actus reus of complicity requires D to do something that assists or encourages the commission of the offence by the principal. This can be an act or, in limited circumstances, an omission where D has a duty to act. The assistance or encouragement must be directed towards the specific offence charged. It is not enough that D’s conduct was generally helpful to the principal — it must have some connection to the offence itself.
In R v Becerra and Cooper, the defendants were part of a group that planned to rob a shop. During the robbery, one of the group killed the shopkeeper. The Court of Appeal held that mere presence at the scene was not sufficient for complicity. The defendant must have actually done something to assist or encourage the offence. The court also set out the requirements for WITHDRAWAL from a joint enterprise: the withdrawal must be communicated to the other participants and must be before the offence is committed. We will come back to withdrawal later.
In R v Andersen and Morris, the defendant was driving a car in which his friend was a passenger. The friend told Andersen to drive alongside another car so he could throw a box at it. Andersen did so, and the box hit and injured the other driver. The court held that by "going along" with his friend’s request, Andersen had given encouragement. Even though he did not say anything or make any gesture, his conduct in complying with the request was capable of amounting to abetting. This case shows that assistance and encouragement can take subtle forms.
The assistance or encouragement must be connected to the specific offence that the principal commits. If D helps the principal commit offence A, and the principal goes on to commit offence B (which D did not intend or foresee), D is liable for A but not B. The exception to this is the doctrine of joint enterprise, where D may be liable for offences that were a foreseen consequence of the joint enterprise, even if they were not specifically agreed.
Assistance does not need to be physical or dramatic. It can include providing information, lending equipment, keeping watch, or even just driving someone to the scene knowing what they intend to do. The question is whether D’s conduct made the commission of the offence more likely or easier. If it did, and D intended to assist, the actus reus of complicity is established.
The mens rea of complicity has two limbs. First, D must INTEND to assist or encourage the principal in the commission of the offence. Second, D must have KNOWLEDGE of the type of offence that the principal is going to commit. D does not need to know every detail of the planned offence, but they must know the essential facts that make the conduct criminal. These two requirements come from R v Bainbridge and the subsequent case law.
In R v Bainbridge, the defendant supplied cutting equipment to a group of men who used it to break into a bank. Bainbridge claimed he did not know what they planned to do with the equipment. The court held that for D to be liable as an accessory, D must know the essential matters that constitute the offence. It is not enough that D merely suspects the principal is going to commit some offence. D must know the TYPE of offence — for example, D must know the tools are for a burglary, not just for some lawful purpose.
In R v Powell and English, the House of Lords considered the mens rea required for a secondary party to be liable for murder. The case established that if D participates in a joint enterprise to cause GBH (which is not murder) and the principal goes on to commit murder, D can be liable for murder if D foresaw that the principal might intentionally kill or cause GBH. This is sometimes called "extended mens rea" for murder in a joint enterprise context. D does not need to intend death — it is enough that D intended to assist and foresaw the possibility that the principal might kill.
R v Jogee was a landmark Supreme Court decision that OVERRULED the previous approach in R v Chan Wing-Siu. In Chan Wing-Siu, the Privy Council had held that foresight of the principal’s actions was SUFFICIENT for mens rea — if D foresaw that the principal might kill, D was automatically liable for murder. Jogee rejected this: foresight is EVIDENCE of intent, not proof. The jury must consider all the circumstances and decide whether D actually intended to assist or encourage the principal in committing the offence. Foresight alone does not prove intent — it is simply a factor for the jury to take into account.
After Jogee, the test for secondary liability in murder cases is as follows. D is liable for murder as a secondary party if: (1) D intentionally assisted or encouraged the principal; (2) D intended the principal to commit the offence charged (i.e. murder); OR (3) D intended to assist or encourage the principal to commit an offence (such as causing GBH) and, in doing so, intended to assist or encourage the principal to commit murder. Foresight that the principal might use lethal force is evidence from which intent may be found, but it is not conclusive.
The distinction between foresight of a possibility and foresight of virtual certainty is crucial after Jogee. If D merely foresees the POSSIBILITY that the principal might kill, this is evidence that D intended to assist the principal in killing, but the jury can decide either way. If D foresees that death or GBH is a VIRTUAL CERTAINTY, the jury is entitled (but not obliged) to find that D intended this result. This mirrors the Woollin direction for direct principal liability. The key point is that foresight never EQUALS intent — it is always just evidence pointing towards intent.
Before Jogee, many textbooks stated that foresight of the principal’s actions was sufficient for secondary liability for murder. This is NO LONGER the law. After Jogee, the prosecution must prove that D actually INTENDED to assist or encourage the principal in committing the offence. Foresight is merely evidence from which intent can be inferred. Make sure you apply the Jogee approach in your exam answers, not the old Chan Wing-Siu approach.
A secondary party may avoid liability if they effectively WITHDRAW from the joint enterprise before the offence is committed. Withdrawal is not a defence in the strict sense — it is a way of negating the actus reus of complicity. If D withdraws in time, their earlier assistance or encouragement is treated as if it never happened. But withdrawal is not easy to establish. The courts set a high threshold because the policy of the law is to discourage participation in crime.
The leading authority on withdrawal remains R v Becerra and Cooper. The court held that for withdrawal to be effective, D must do TWO things. First, D must COMMUNICATE the withdrawal to the other participants. This means D must clearly tell the others that they are no longer taking part. Second, the withdrawal must take place BEFORE the offence is committed. Once the offence has started, it is too late to withdraw. The communication must be UNEQUIVOCAL — the others must be left in no doubt that D is no longer participating.
In R v Rook, the defendant had planned a robbery with others but decided not to take part on the day. He did not communicate his withdrawal to the others. The court held that failure to communicate the withdrawal meant Rook remained liable as a secondary party. It was not enough that he simply did not turn up or stayed away from the scene. The whole point of the communication requirement is to give the other participants the opportunity to change their plans. Without communication, the others might still be relying on D’s participation.
In R v Grundy, the defendant had participated in a plan to assault the victim. Before the assault, Grundy told the others that he did not want to take part and walked away. The court held that this could amount to effective withdrawal, depending on the facts. The key question was whether Grundy’s communication was clear enough and whether it gave the others a genuine opportunity to reconsider. The court emphasised that the circumstances of each case will determine whether withdrawal was effective.
If D has already provided assistance (such as lending a weapon), withdrawal may require D to take positive steps to neutralise that assistance. For example, if D lent a knife, D should try to get it back. If D cannot recover the weapon, D should at least warn the others not to use it. The extent of the steps required depends on the circumstances. In an exam, you should always consider whether D did everything reasonably possible to neutralise their earlier participation.
An innocent agent is a person who carries out the physical act of an offence without the mens rea required for that offence. The innocent agent is not guilty because they lack the necessary mental element. However, the person who used the innocent agent can still be liable as a PRINCIPAL offender, not merely as an accessory. This is because the law treats the person behind the scenes as the true perpetrator — they are using the innocent agent as a tool to commit the offence.
In R v Michael, the defendant sent a letter to the victim’s employer, falsely accusing the victim of dishonesty, knowing the employer would dismiss the victim. The employer was the innocent agent — they did the act (dismissal) but had no criminal intent. Michael was held liable as the principal offender because he used the employer as an instrument to achieve his criminal purpose. The employer’s lack of mens rea did not prevent Michael’s liability.
In R v C, the defendant (a child) was used by adults to carry drugs. The child was too young to form the mens rea for the offence. The adults who used the child were held liable as principals because they used the child as an innocent agent to commit the offence. This case illustrates how the doctrine of innocent agency can apply in modern drug offences and how the law ensures that the real criminals behind the scheme are held responsible.
Remember the difference between an innocent agent and an accomplice. An accomplice has mens rea and is liable as a secondary party. An innocent agent has NO mens rea and is not liable at all. The person who uses the innocent agent is treated as the principal, not as an accessory. This means they face the full penalty for the offence, not a reduced sentence for secondary participation.
Whosoever shall become an accessory after the fact to any felony or to any indictable offence by or at the instance of any accessory before the fact, or shall receive, relieve, comfort, or assist any felon or misdemeanant, knowing him to have been a felon or to have been guilty of the said misdemeanant in order to enable him to escape from apprehension or conviction, shall be guilty of an offence.
To be liable as an accessory after the fact, D must: (1) know that the principal has committed an offence; (2) do something to help the principal escape apprehension or conviction; and (3) intend to help the principal avoid detection or punishment. The help can include hiding the principal, providing false alibis, disposing of evidence, or helping the principal flee the jurisdiction. The key difference from other forms of complicity is that the assistance happens AFTER the offence, not before or during.
Being an accessory after the fact is a separate offence with its own penalty (up to three years’ imprisonment). Unlike accessories before the fact under s.8, an accessory after the fact is NOT liable as a principal. They face a lower maximum sentence. This reflects the policy that assisting after the offence, while serious, is less culpable than planning or assisting before or during the offence.
Part 2 of the Serious Crime Act 2007 created new offences that are designed to catch conduct that falls outside the scope of common law complicity. Under the common law, D is only liable as an accessory if the principal actually commits the offence. The 2007 Act offences can be committed even if the principal never carries out the offence. This is a significant extension of criminal liability and is designed to allow the police to intervene earlier in the criminal process.
Under s.44, D commits an offence if D does an act capable of encouraging or assisting the commission of an offence, and D INTENDS to encourage or assist its commission. The key difference from common law complicity is that D can be guilty even if the principal offence is never committed. The offence is complete when D acts with the required intent. The principal does not need to do anything. The maximum sentence is the same as for the offence D intended to encourage or assist.
Under s.45, D commits an offence if D does an act capable of encouraging or assisting the commission of an offence, and D BELIEVES that the offence will be committed and that the act will encourage or assist it. The mens rea is lower than s.44 — D does not need to intend the offence, only to believe it will happen. This captures situations where D facilitates an offence (such as lending tools for a burglary) while disapproving of the crime but knowing it will take place.
Under s.46, D commits an offence if D does an act capable of encouraging or assisting one or more offences, and D believes that one or more of those offences will be committed and that the act will encourage or assist one or more of them. This is the broadest of the three offences because D does not need to know which specific offence will be committed. It is sufficient that D believes some offence within a range of possible offences will occur.
An attempt is an inchoate offence, meaning it is incomplete. D tries to commit a crime but fails, or is prevented from completing it. The law criminalises attempts because D has demonstrated a criminal intention by taking steps towards the commission of the offence, even though the full offence was not completed. The rationale is that D is just as blameworthy as if they had succeeded — the only thing that saved the victim was luck or external circumstances.
If, with intent to commit an offence to which this section applies, a person does an act which is more than merely preparatory to the commission of the offence, he is guilty of attempting to commit the offence.
Section 1(1) sets out two elements for criminal attempt. First, D must have the INTENT to commit the offence. Second, D must do an act that is MORE THAN MERELY PREPARATORY to the commission of the offence. Both elements must be proved. The mens rea requires specific intent — recklessness is not enough. The actus reus requires D to have gone beyond mere preparation and started the actual commission of the offence.
Section 1(1) applies to any indictable offence. This includes murder, robbery, burglary, theft, and other serious offences. It does not apply to summary-only offences. Attempted summary offences are not covered by the 1981 Act, although they can exist at common law. In practice, the offences most commonly charged as attempts are murder, robbery, and burglary.
The Criminal Attempts Act 1981 does not define what counts as "more than merely preparatory." This is a question of fact for the jury in each case. The courts have developed a flexible approach based on the "continuity theory" — the idea that the commission of an offence is a continuous process, and once D has started along that process and gone beyond mere preparation, D is attempting the offence. The question is whether D has moved from the realm of planning and preparation into the realm of execution.
In R v Gullefer, the defendant and others planned to disrupt a greyhound race by running onto the track, causing the race to be abandoned and allowing them to collect on bets they had already placed. Gullefer ran onto the track but was stopped before he could disrupt the race. The court held that this was MERELY PREPARATORY. Gullefer had not started the actual commission of the offence of obtaining property by deception. He was still in the preparation stage. This case establishes that conduct which is part of the planning or setting up of the offence is not enough.
In R v Campbell, the defendant approached a woman with an imitation firearm and demanded money. He was arrested before he could take anything. The court held that this was MORE THAN MERELY PREPARATORY. Campbell had taken a substantial step towards the commission of the robbery. He was at the scene, had his weapon ready, and had made the demand. He had moved beyond mere preparation and into the execution of the offence. The fact that he was prevented from completing the robbery by his arrest did not matter.
In R v Geddes, the defendant was found hiding in a toilet cubicle at a school, wearing a mask and carrying a rope and a knife. He had not approached any child or made any attempt to do so. The court held that this was MERELY PREPARATORY. Geddes had equipped himself for the offence and was in position, but he had not taken any step towards actually committing it. The court emphasised that the proximity of D’s acts to the completed offence is the key factor. Mere presence at the scene with the tools of the offence is not enough.
In R v Jones, the defendant was found outside a house with a crowbar, having damaged the window frame in an attempt to break in. He had not entered the building. The court held that this was MORE THAN MERELY PREPARATORY. The damage to the window frame showed that Jones had started the actual execution of the burglary. He was no longer just preparing — he had begun the physical act of breaking in. This contrasts with Geddes, where the defendant had not taken any physical step towards the offence.
In R v Boyle and Dalton, the defendants planned to rob a jeweller. They entered the shop, one asked to see some watches, and the other then produced a hammer. The court held that entering the shop and engaging the jeweller was MORE THAN MERELY PREPARATORY. The defendants had taken affirmative steps that were immediately connected to the commission of the robbery. The case shows that the "more than merely preparatory" test is fact-sensitive and depends on the proximity of D’s acts to the completed offence.
In R v Wang, the defendant entered a house intending to steal. He was discovered by the householder and fled before taking anything. The court held that this was an ATTEMPT. The act of entering the house with intent to steal was itself more than merely preparatory to the burglary. The fact that Wang was interrupted before he could complete the offence did not prevent liability for attempt. This case confirms that once D has taken a substantial step towards the offence, the attempt is complete even if D does not get very far.
In R v Matthews, the defendant was found with his arm through a broken window of a post office, having reached in but not yet taken anything. The court held that this was an ATTEMPT to steal. The act of reaching into the building was more than merely preparatory — it was part of the actual execution of the theft. This case is useful for showing that even a very small physical step towards the completed offence can be enough if it is part of the execution rather than preparation.
The mens rea of attempt is SPECIFIC INTENT to commit the full offence. D must actually intend to carry out the offence in its entirety. Recklessness is NOT sufficient for attempt. This is a higher threshold than for many completed offences. For example, for attempted murder, D must intend to kill or cause GBH — it is not enough that D was reckless as to whether death would result. For attempted theft, D must intend to permanently deprive — borrowing without permission, even recklessly, is not attempted theft.
In R v Khan, the defendant gave a woman a substance he believed was a date-rape drug, intending to stupefy her so he could have sex with her. The substance turned out to be harmless. The court held that Khan was not guilty of attempted rape because he did not have the mens rea for the offence of administering a substance with intent to commit a sexual offence. The reasoning was that D must intend the full offence, including all its elements. If D does not intend the actus reus of the full offence, there can be no attempt.
In R v Shivpuri, the defendant agreed to carry packages from abroad that he believed contained heroin or cannabis. The packages turned out to contain harmless brown powder. Shivpuri was arrested and charged with attempting to be knowingly concerned in the fraudulent evasion of the prohibition on the importation of a controlled drug. The House of Lords held that he WAS guilty of attempt, even though the substance was harmless. D’s MISTAKE about the nature of the substance did not prevent liability for attempt.
Khan and Shivpuri can appear contradictory but the distinction is this: Khan involved a situation where D’s actions could never have constituted the full offence (the substance was incapable of stupefying). Shivpuri involved a situation where D’s actions WOULD have constituted the full offence if the substance had been what D believed. In Shivpuri, the only thing wrong was D’s belief about the contents. The key point is that factual impossibility is no defence to attempt — what matters is D’s intention.
Factual impossibility occurs when D tries to commit an offence but it is impossible to complete because of some factual circumstance that D does not know about. For example, D tries to steal from an empty pocket, or D tries to pick a lock that is already broken, or D tries to kill someone who is already dead. Under the Criminal Attempts Act 1981, factual impossibility is NO DEFENCE to attempt. D is judged based on what D believed and intended, not on what was actually possible.
R v Shivpuri is the leading authority on impossible attempts. The House of Lords held that s.1(1) of the Criminal Attempts Act 1981 was intended to abolish the defence of impossibility. D can be guilty of attempt even if the facts as D believed them to be would not have constituted the offence. What matters is that D intended to commit the offence and did acts that were more than merely preparatory. The fact that the offence was impossible to complete due to factual circumstances unknown to D is irrelevant.
In R v Anderton v Ryan, the defendant had bought what she believed was a stolen video recorder. In fact, it was not stolen at all. The House of Lords held she could not be guilty of attempted handling of stolen goods because the goods were not stolen. This decision was widely criticised and was OVERRULED by the House of Lords in R v Shivpuri. After Shivpuri, impossibility is no defence. If D believes the goods are stolen and acts with intent to handle them, D can be guilty of attempted handling even if the goods were never stolen.
In R v G, the defendants believed they were having sex with a woman who had consented. In fact, the woman was unconscious and incapable of consent. The court held that there was no attempted rape because the defendants did not have the mens rea for rape — they believed the woman was consenting. This is different from a standard impossibility case because here the impossibility went to the mens rea, not just the actus reus. D cannot attempt an offence that D does not believe they are committing.
In R v Haughton and Smith, the defendants picked the pocket of a man who was already dead. They were charged with attempted theft. The court held that they were NOT guilty of attempted theft because you cannot steal from a corpse — property belongs to the estate of the deceased, not to the deceased person. However, after Shivpuri, this reasoning is questionable. If the defendants believed the man was alive and intended to steal from him, they may now be guilty of attempted theft. The Shivpuri principle suggests that factual impossibility should not be a defence.
After Shivpuri, the general rule is that factual impossibility is NO defence to attempt. If D intends to commit an offence and does acts that are more than merely preparatory, D is guilty of attempt, regardless of whether the offence was actually possible to complete. The exception is where the impossibility goes to the mens rea — if D does not believe they are committing the offence, there is no intent and therefore no attempt (R v G).
A person guilty of an attempt to commit an offence shall be liable on conviction on indictment to the same penalty to which he would have been liable if he had committed the offence, except that on a conviction for attempt to murder he shall not be sentenced to more than life imprisonment.
Under s.4(1) of the Criminal Attempts Act 1981, a person convicted of attempt faces the SAME maximum sentence as for the completed offence. So attempted robbery carries the same maximum as robbery (life imprisonment), and attempted burglary carries the same maximum as burglary. However, in practice, the court will usually impose a LOWER sentence for attempt than for the completed offence, because the harm caused is less. The sentence reflects both D’s culpability (which is high, since D intended the full offence) and the actual harm caused (which may be minimal if the offence was not completed).
In your exam, the most important point is that attempt carries the SAME MAXIMUM sentence as the completed offence. But you should also note that the court will typically give a LOWER sentence for attempt than for the completed offence. The rationale is that while D is just as morally culpable, the actual harm caused is less. The court takes both culpability and harm into account when determining the appropriate sentence.
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